afe66: Slightly off topic but my other half did BA Heathrow nervous flier course which is run by senior pilots with many many hours.

One person asked one of the pilots had they been nervous due to turbulence. I think he had 20k plus hours or something ridiculous flying wide body jets, and he said only once and that was for about 5 minutes. His comment was the planes are very over engineered.

Despite having done quite a few hundred flights in my life, I *hate* flying. Every sound, bump, movement. Even when I understand it's supposed to be happening, it's still me holding the seat with a death grip and sweating.

I have found ensuring a good nights sleep the night before makes a big difference, along with flying business where I can. Noise Cancelling Headphones helped quite a bit.

I think was that the was inevitable conclusion. And now the Board can hire someone under the guise of 'improving culture', fire a whole bunch of desk jockeys and rinse and repeat.

The shareholder mantra of constant growth is such a toxic culture.

PolicyGuy: Boeing board sacks CEO

https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/boeing-ceo-resigns/ 

Now starts the horse trading to get all the Alphabets (FAA, EASA, CAAC, CASA, CAA, Air Transport Canada etc) to sign off on the fix.

It's my guess the "fixes" have been designed, very thoroughly tested, and tested and tested and are ready for release into the wild. The rest of the process is now political.

Here's how I think this is possibly playing out behind the scenes.

Boeing have to be seen to be making organisational changes, Muilenburg's resignation is the start. Ultimately for Boeing, there needs to be quite a change at the top away from private equity money people, but that is another story.

The FAA have been accused of being too cosy with Boeing, they will make sure this process is seen to be squeaky clean and that their processes have changed. They will have to be seen to have had a significant input and oversight. Possibly to the extent of requiring changes and testing which may not be really necessary just to show they have been "doing their job".

Some of the other Alphabets will have a point to prove, they won't just accept the FAA sign off. They will want their own input. In the case of the Chinese it was reported that their very prompt suspension of Max flights was more to do with the Chinese/US trade war than concerns about the Max. This is another type of factor that also enters the mix.

How long the political game will carry on for is anyone's guess. Sadly it will not likely lead to any beneficial changes to the Max BUT will cost significant amounts of money.

There were hints many weeks ago that the Max could be in service again by year end 2019. That to me indicated the fixes had been made and tested awaiting approval. Now there are reports of the Max being removed from airline schedules out as far as mid 2020. Perhaps due to a protracted politicised approval process?

kingdragonfly: Of course, Boeing did not respond to questions about how much Muilenburg will collect in severance pay.

Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg has a severance package of $40M and an $800K annual pension according to company filings.

You could say the whole fiasco is a business successfully working with politicians to weaken the FAA. Ultimately it's the politicians' fault, with the lion-share of fault going to the Republicans.

I bet many car manufacturers would love to self-certify cars they were selling instead of submitting it to various independent agencies for crash-tests.

Sorry, I don't follow your logic. I don't see how this is anything to do with politicians. The way aircraft manufacturers certify their aircraft in the US is the same as in Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc.

I not sure but I suspect car manufacturing isn't much different. There are design rules and the manufacturer has to show compliance with them. 

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50893490 "Boeing has said the MCAS software system, which relied on a single sensor, received erroneous data, which led it to override pilot commands and push the aircraft downwards."

I would have thought that a plane this modern and complex would of had double redundancy ?

FineWine:

 

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50893490 "Boeing has said the MCAS software system, which relied on a single sensor, received erroneous data, which led it to override pilot commands and push the aircraft downwards."

 

I would have thought that a plane this modern and complex would of had double redundancy ?

 

 

 

I don't know if you're meaning double redundancy (two separate systems each with their own redundancy) or just redundancy.

The redundancy issue has been been debated more than once. An extra sensor on it's own doesn't cut the mustard. When one fails, which one is assumed to be correct?

I won't go into great detail but there were other systems that provided validation of the single sensor input to the MCAS. These required pilot interpretation which was poorly executed (due to poor training, poor understanding of the correct procedures or other potential reasons) in the crash aircraft.

FineWine:

 

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50893490 "Boeing has said the MCAS software system, which relied on a single sensor, received erroneous data, which led it to override pilot commands and push the aircraft downwards."

 

I would have thought that a plane this modern and complex would of had double redundancy ?

 

I think the theory was that in the case of a sensor failure the crew would use the standard runaway trim procedure which would allow the aircraft to continue to fly safely.

There is one thing that I still can't understand about this whole situation. Did the runaway trim procedure call for the crew to use the yoke mounted controls to correct the trim before activating the electric trim cut-out switches? Or were they supposed to use the cut-out switches immediately and then use the trim-wheel to correct the trim? It seems like the Ethiopian crew did the latter, but it was impossible for them to use the trim wheel due to their excessive speed.

I still think the fact that the MCAS system was designed the way it was, and that there was no serious training of the pilots on the MAX shows how deeply flawed this whole project was.

Would not shed a tear if this breaks Boeing and the Max never fly again.

jarledb:

 

Would not shed a tear if this breaks Boeing and the Max never fly again.

 

The market for large airliners in the western world is a duopoly. If that were to become a monopoly then that would have huge implications.

It's a shame we no longer have McDonnell Douglas or Lockheed in the civil aviation market.

jarledb:

 

I still think the fact that the MCAS system was designed the way it was, and that there was no serious training of the pilots on the MAX shows how deeply flawed this whole project was.

 

Would not shed a tear if this breaks Boeing and the Max never fly again.

 

I'm the exact opposite. I would happily fly on a MAX tomorrow if they were flying.

What is concerning is *every* other aircraft out there that hasn't had the same level of scrutiny that the MAX has now had, and since the 2 MAX crashes the number of flight control changes that have been made by both Airbus and Boeing on other aircraft.

alasta:

FineWine:

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50893490 "Boeing has said the MCAS software system, which relied on a single sensor, received erroneous data, which led it to override pilot commands and push the aircraft downwards."

I would have thought that a plane this modern and complex would of had double redundancy ?

I think the theory was that in the case of a sensor failure the crew would use the standard runaway trim procedure which would allow the aircraft to continue to fly safely.

There is one thing that I still can't understand about this whole situation. Did the runaway trim procedure call for the crew to use the yoke mounted controls to correct the trim before activating the electric trim cut-out switches? Or were they supposed to use the cut-out switches immediately and then use the trim-wheel to correct the trim? It seems like the Ethiopian crew did the latter, but it was impossible for them to use the trim wheel due to their excessive speed.

sbiddle:

jarledb:

I still think the fact that the MCAS system was designed the way it was, and that there was no serious training of the pilots on the MAX shows how deeply flawed this whole project was.

Would not shed a tear if this breaks Boeing and the Max never fly again.

I'm the exact opposite. I would happily fly on a MAX tomorrow if they were flying.

What is concerning is *every* other aircraft out there that hasn't had the same level of scrutiny that the MAX has now had, and since the 2 MAX crashes the number of flight control changes that have been made by both Airbus and Boeing on other aircraft.