https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
TL;DR, Teams auth tokens are stored unencrypted and accessible by any user of a machine, even non privileged users.
https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
TL;DR, Teams auth tokens are stored unencrypted and accessible by any user of a machine, even non privileged users.
I'm a geek, a gamer, a dad and an IT Professional. I have a full rack home lab, size 15 feet, an epic beard and Asperger's. I'm a bit of a Cypherpunk, who believes information wants to be free and the Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.
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Wow. Thanks for posting this.
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Thanks heaps for that
"accessible by any user of a machine, even non privileged users" I don't believe this is true, but happy to be proved wrong. The token should be stored in the user profile and only that user would have access to it. An administrator on the machine would be able to get to it, but that's by design and is part of the trust model of having administrator rights. Perhaps encrypting the file would be a good idea, but there are lots of tokens stored in a user profile that contain sensitive data.
Until I see something else I agree with Amanzi, the folders they are telling you to monitor are within user profiles. You'd need local admin priv's to gain access without using another privesc vuln.
It's certainly could evolve into something that can be drive-by'ed but right now you'd need access and other vulns
Lias: PSA: Don't use Teams on shared devices. TL;DR, Teams auth tokens are stored unencrypted and accessible by any user of a machine, even non privileged users.
TBH, if an attacker had local or remote access to the file system (which is required to get a hold of these tokens), there's other issues that need to be addressed first.
Yeah it's not a point of entry, could be used for lateral movement but so could a keylogger at that point.
Beccara:
Yeah it's not a point of entry, could be used for lateral movement but so could a keylogger at that point.
Better option would be to grab the browser profiles.
amanzi:
"accessible by any user of a machine, even non privileged users" I don't believe this is true, but happy to be proved wrong. The token should be stored in the user profile and only that user would have access to it. An administrator on the machine would be able to get to it, but that's by design and is part of the trust model of having administrator rights. Perhaps encrypting the file would be a good idea, but there are lots of tokens stored in a user profile that contain sensitive data.
"an attack path that enables malicious actors with file system access to steal credentials for any Microsoft Teams user who is signed in. Attackers do not require elevated permissions to read these files, which exposes this concern to any attack that provides malicious actors with local or remote system access"
I'm a geek, a gamer, a dad and an IT Professional. I have a full rack home lab, size 15 feet, an epic beard and Asperger's. I'm a bit of a Cypherpunk, who believes information wants to be free and the Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.
Lias:/Article: Attackers do not require elevated permissions to read these files
using the browser version inside incognito is okay other than that no no no and no
Any views expressed on these forums are my own and don't necessarily reflect those of my employer.
Lias:i.e. attackers who have access to the running user account do not need to elevate permissions to read files owned by the running user account. There are certainly more-protected ways to store credentials, but this article is hyperbolic clickbait (and there's nothing to do with shared devices or multiple users even then).
"an attack path that enables malicious actors with file system access to steal credentials for any Microsoft Teams user who is signed in. Attackers do not require elevated permissions to read these files, which exposes this concern to any attack that provides malicious actors with local or remote system access"
Lias:
"an attack path that enables malicious actors with file system access to steal credentials for any Microsoft Teams user who is signed in. Attackers do not require elevated permissions to read these files, which exposes this concern to any attack that provides malicious actors with local or remote system access"
As I and others have pointed out in this thread you're getting confused with the threat, and the inflammatory way this article is written is not helping. The tokens are only accessible by the user that created the token, or someone with administrator privileges to the computer. You started this thread with a title that said, "Don't use Teams on shared devices" and then you made a claim that these tokens are "accessible by any user of a machine, even non privileged users". But that is absolutely not true and can easily be verified by anyone who is using Teams by checking the file permissions of the files mentioned in the article. On a Windows machine these tokens are stored in the %APPDATA% directory which is only accessible by the logged-on user (and an administrator account). So a non-privileged user would not be able to access another user's token on a shared device. I haven't tested this on Linux or macOS so I can't say for sure, but I know the default behaviour on either of these operating systems is that anything inside the home directory is only accessible by that user.
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